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Abstract The professional community of policy experts takes it for granted that all
governments seek to strengthen their policy capacity, considering it a key indicator and
requisite of their success. Yet this assumption is far from universal, even in some European
Union countries with long and complex institutional histories. If we look at the informed
and explicit use of policy analysis tools in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, we have to
conclude that this paradigm is not completely integrated into their governmentality. In
these countries, three disciplinary approaches warrant especial attention as generators of
competencies recognized as usable knowledge for public decisions: ‘law,’ ‘public finance’
and ‘public administration.’ Where the standard operating procedures of democratic
institutions appear to be fully defined on the basis of these three categories, the inclusion of
the policy perspective encounters major difficulties. In these contexts, the most important
obstacle is the fear that the new paradigm will threaten the balance among the constitu-
tional bodies, especially to the detriment of the legislature, and that it will constrict the
political leadership. This explains why some countries, such as France and, most recently,
Italy, have attempted to resolve the impasse by resorting to the strongest of legitimations:
inclusion in their constitutions of public policy evaluation as a function of Parliament. This
choice is certainly important, but in itself it does not guarantee recognition of the policy
paradigm as a science for democratic institutions.
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Thirty years ago, Brian Hogwood, one of the authors who has contributed most to the
spread of policy analysis in Europe, wrote: ‘Often American authors write as though the
United States were the only place in the universe which had public policy’ (Hogwood
1984: 27). Today, many authors, in universities or international organizations, write as
though the entire universe had public policy. This assumption is generally taken for granted
in international comparisons, both descriptive and evaluative, especially when they con-
cern countries with consolidated democracies.
In fact, the capacity of governments to effectively formulate, implement and evaluate
their public policies is part of the better known and more standardized indicators of ‘good
governance.’1 In these comparisons, it is taken for granted that the activities through which
governments seek to change (or maintain) the status quo can be universally defined as
‘policy making.’
This assumption is fully consistent with Thomas Dye’s well-known definition: ‘Public
policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do’ (Dye 1972: 1). This indeterminate
definition has the advantage of allowing the inclusion of all countries in the comparison,
even when the self-representations provided by their institutions make no reference to the
categories of policy analysis and evaluation and describe the activities of their governments
in terms of value affirming, reassignment of rights and duties, or conflict resolution.
From this perspective, public policies are the output of governments like radon emis-
sions are the output of granite rocks. The correct evaluation of their strength is guaranteed
by the competence of the observers, and their capacity to develop measurement methods
based on objective standards.
But, as explained in lesson number one of every course in public policy, Dye’s defi-
nition is the most inclusive extreme of a continuum at whose opposite end is a much more
demanding and restrictive concept. Since the founder of policy sciences, Harold Lasswell
(1951), numerous authors have associated policy making with a conscious activity of social
problem solving: ‘[Policy is] a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of
actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern’ (Anderson 1975: 3). In fact, all the
most widely used models of analysis are based on definitions of the policy cycle whose
stages have close relationships with those of problem solving in complex adaptive social
systems, from problem definition, through formulation of alternative solutions, to imple-
mentation and evaluation (Peters 1996; Lodge and Wegrich 2014).
In international comparisons, this second, more restrictive, definition of policy comes
into play when the quality of what governments do is assessed. The explicit and intentional
utilization of these tools in institutional contexts by decision-makers indicates, in fact, a set
of abilities central to the requirements of good governance, usually denoted with expres-
sions such as ‘policy capacity,’ ‘policy management,’ ‘policy efficacy,’ and ‘evaluation
capacity’ (De Peuter and Pattyn 2009).
The concept of policy analytical capacity (CAP) has the merit of giving greater clarity
to these specific technical skills by showing the differences that they make when applied
intelligently and appropriately from the first stage of decision-making onwards, and not
just in the phase of ex post evaluation (Howlett 2009; Woo et al. 2015).
1 See, for instance, World Bank, The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.




From a descriptive point of view, this type of assessment has great informative potential
because it enables comparison among countries with very different political institutions
and administrative structures. Its shortcomings are usually emphasized by those who
consider these criteria to be particularly problematic when applied to developing countries,
where these analytical abilities are harder to find, with a consequent overestimation of the
capacity gaps of those governments. Indeed, in this frame, the fact that some governments
do not define their activities in a manner such that they can be related to the categories of
policy analysis does not exempt them from this assessment; rather, it gives rise to a
negative evaluation, being interpreted as an outright deficiency, a shortage in their steering
capabilities.
This paper seeks to explain why, for very different reasons, these parameters may be
inappropriate even for some major continental European countries, such as France, Ger-
many, Spain, and Italy, with long and complex institutional histories, and where the
concept of policy as a logic of action to solve problems of collective importance is not yet
fully part of the tools of government.
Until the end of the 1980s, the governments of these countries accomplished important
changes, such as post-war reconstruction, the social reforms of the 1960s, the creation of
new infrastructures, and the reorganization of health services, although they entirely
ignored the instruments that derive from the more exacting concepts of policy. The
preparatory phase was not structured on the basis of the recommendations for smart policy
formulation. The implementation phase ignored the categories of what terms itself ‘the
logic model’ (Bickman 1987; Kellogg Foundation 2004). The ex post assessment phase
was based on evidence that an analyst would regard as entirely insubstantial. Some of these
interventions were successful, and others were not. On considering the various interna-
tional comparisons, it is evident that France and Germany achieved positive results in
many sectors. Other countries, such as Italy, registered severe failures. But it is difficult to
tie the success of these demanding interventions to the use of categories that, until a few
years ago in those countries, existed only in university textbooks and are still today
unrelated in many sectors to the logic actually followed by those who take public decisions
and those who implement them.
The first goal of our investigation is to gain better understanding of the institutional and
epistemic balances relied upon by these European systems of government whose consol-
idated repertoires of standard operating procedures do not comprise the prescriptions that
derive from the most exacting concept of policy. The second objective is to analyze the
problems of compatibility which arise in the same countries when, especially under the
pressure of external dynamics, they attempt to adopt this unprecedented view of public
intervention. These difficulties tend to be neglected in comparisons that consider the lack
of policy capacity as merely a gap to be filled with a ‘software update’ to enlarge the
functionalities of government. Instead, we contend that, in many respects, in these coun-
tries the competencies prescribed equate to the installation of a new operating system. This
explains why, in some countries, the adoption of this analytical perspective requires the
formally more stringent legitimacy provided by the inclusion of policy evaluation in
constitutional texts, a process which France has already completed, and which Italy has
recently undertaken, but without success.
To prove this thesis, we will use the concept of governmentality (Foucault 1977–1978)
to identify the epistemic, institutional and regulatory aspects that differentiate the logic of
public choice in the Anglo-American countries, which have incorporated the use of policy
tools because of endogenous pressures and in incremental manner, from the continental
European countries, where this assimilation has exogenous origins and a greater impact.
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In particular, we will explore the critical function of evaluation policy in parliaments; an
aspect that sheds light on the relationship between, on the one hand, the mechanisms of
representative democracy based on political preferences, and on the other, the technical
competences aimed at improving the treatment of problems of collective importance
(Regonini 2012).
From governance to governmentality
In order to understand the causes of the differing levels of policy capacity among demo-
cratic countries, useful analytical insights may arise if one uses the concept of govern-
mentality rather than that of governance (Burchell et al. 1991; Miller and Rose 2008; Bevir
2010). ‘Governmentality’ is a term coined by Foucault—and which he declined with a
variety of meanings—in a complex endeavor to reconstruct the changes that between the
second half of the 1500s and the early 1800s laid the bases for the exercise of the particular
type of power which has since then distinguished the mode of government in the modern
European states: ‘The modern state is born, I think, when governmentality became a
calculated and reflected practice’ (Foucault 1977–1978: 222). One of these meanings
brings to the fore the relationship between, on the one hand, political institutions, their
organizations and practices, and on the other, the conceptions of the public sphere that
legitimate and support them by providing competencies, technical procedures, and ethical
justifications. The growth of integration between the state organization and the ‘sciences of
the public institutions’—i.e., epistemic perspectives that give a both ‘ontological’2 and
technical foundation to the competencies attributed to themselves by the political
authorities—has played a crucial role in consolidation of the modern idea of government
(Foucault 1977–1978: 144).
The second interesting aspect of the concept of governmentality is the nondeterministic
manner in which reconstruction is made of the appearance or disappearance of the various
categories able to render the public sphere intelligible, organizable and modifiable (Rose
1996; Bevir 2010). The beginning and outcome of this process are identified thus by
Foucault: ‘the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘‘governmentalized’’’ (Foucault 1977–
1978: 144). Yet the way in which this process came about in different countries is very
distant from a pattern of uniform development. It is precisely the genealogy of the concept
of policy that furnishes a clear example of the nonlinearity of the trajectories whereby, in
different periods and in different nations, the categories used to define what governments
can and must do have arisen. As not only Foucault but also many European political
scientists (Heidenheimer 1986; Bobbio 1987; Sartori 1989) have emphasized, in the second
half of the 1700s, the feature shared by the English word ‘policy’ (or ‘police’), the German
‘polizei,’ and the French ‘police’ was still reference to government activity as a service to
the ‘politeia’—as the pursuit of the well-being and happiness of the governed (Heiden-
heimer 1986: 10).3 It was with this meaning that the terms were employed by Friedrich
Hegel and Adam Smith. In the German-speaking countries, Polizeiwissenschaften were
2 Here the word ‘ontology’ is used with reference to one of the most quoted definitions in the Knowledge
Engineering community: ‘An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization’ (Gruber 1993:
199).




studied for purposes very similar to those of the contemporary policy sciences (Dean 1994:
185).
During the 1800s, in the countries of continental Europe, the terms ‘police,’ ‘polizei,’
‘polizia,’ ‘policı´a’ increasingly acquired their contemporary meaning as apparatuses for the
control and repression of deviant behavior (Dyson 1980), leaving France, Germany, Italy,
and Spain without an equivalent for the English word ‘policy.’ There is one date that above
all marks the extent of this divergence: namely 1943. In that year, Harold Lasswell later
acknowledged as the father of policy sciences, while serving as Chief of the Experimental
Division for the Study of War Time Communications at the Library of Congress, coauthored
with Myres McDougal the article entitled ‘Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest’ (Lasswell and McDougal 1943). But in that same year,
Europe was devastated by the most atrocious Polizei-Staat experiment of all human history.
Even after the consolidation of democratic regimes in all the countries of continental
Western Europe, the everyday languages of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain still possess
a single term to denote the entire ‘family-polis of words’ that in English is articulated
among ‘polity,’ ‘politics,’ and ‘policy’ (Heidenheimer 1986: 4; von Beyme 2013). In those
countries, and not only in France, policy analysis and evaluation remain ‘a ‘‘pure’’ import’
(Muller 2008: 53).
Detailed reconstruction of the problems encountered by the institutionalization of
policy analysis in Germany (Blum and Schubert 2013) and France (Jobert and Muller
1987; Me´ny and Thœnig 1989; Giraud and Warin 2008) yields a composite picture of the
factors which impede this implant. As we have seen, comparisons which employ standard
definitions of governance represent the weak policy capacity of some governments as a
deficit, a lack, a void. An approach centered on governmentality can evidence that the
under-utilization of policy analysis and evaluation is due to the success of other disci-
plinary perspectives in acquiring legitimacy and robustness as sciences of institutions that
furnish clear and convincing representations of what is meant when one speaks of
‘government.’ As we shall shortly see, the reference is mainly to three ontologies—‘law,’
‘public finance,’ and ‘public administration’—which in many continental European
countries continue to provide the semantic frames of reference for designing and giving
account of what institutions do.
Finally, the idea of governmentality acknowledges that ‘[t]here is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does
not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations’ (Foucault 1977–1978: 27).
In our democratic societies, compatibility between power relations and fields of knowledge
requires firstly that any new interpretation of what the institutions do must not weaken the
capacity for control that citizens, voters and taxpayers are entitled to exercise over gov-
ernments through their representatives, and secondly that it is not contrary to the division
of powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. As we shall see in what follows,
where policy analysis and evaluation remain ‘pure’ imports, if not external impositions,
these guarantees are often considered under pressure.
The other disciplines of the public institutions
The first problem that the policy paradigm must overcome when it leaves the domain of
academic study and proposes itself as a tool with which to define and improve what
governments do is to withstand comparison with the disciplinary perspectives that already
enjoy solid institutionalization in the guidance of res publica. In the countries of
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continental Europe, three areas are universally recognized as essential components of not
good governance (a term incomprehensible for ordinary citizens and their representatives
in these countries), but good government: clear laws, carefully handled public money, and
well-organized administrations. The labels for these three areas—law, public finance, and
public administration—share an ambivalence: They denote both the levers for government
action and the disciplines furnishing the parameters with which to formulate, evaluate, and
improve decisions in their respective fields of reference. This intimate relationship between
power and knowledge, between the production of effects that change the lives of citizens
and the development of competence testifies to the close integration among these three
components in the governmentality of contemporary states.
As regards the ‘law’ paradigm, its institutional embeddedness is quite clear, given that
the ‘rule of law’ has become synonymous with respect for the rights of citizens, from the rise
of the medieval ‘state of justice’ to modern liberal constitutionalism (Foucault 1977–1978).
The institutional recognition of the ‘public finance’ paradigm has its roots in the modern
revolutions whose purpose was to curb the sovereign’s power to tax and to spend (Webber
and Wildavsky 1986). In order to ensure the proper management of public money, the
competencies of parliaments were extended and specific independent structures, the
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI), were created.
As regards the public administration, in continental Europe, at least in theory, and at
least until very recent years, the principles of ‘precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of
the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of
material and personal costs’ (Weber 1922–1978: 971) exercised within the constraints of
the Napoleonic administrative codes or the Rechtsstaat principles, were considered to
protect, and not to threaten, the constitutional rights of citizens.
These three building blocks are powerful descriptors that provide comprehensive and
consistent accounts of what governments do. And they are also authoritative prescriptive
frames that indicate how governments should do what they do. Each of them has its own
production cycle, parameters to measure performance, and formal rules to ensure its
procedural accountability and compatibility with the powers of the constitutional bodies.
Moreover, a set of mechanisms linking and integrating the three perspectives—for
instance, rules on the financial coverage of laws and the competencies of administrative
justice—ensure unity and coherence among the different logics.
The concrete outcomes of this type of ‘policyless’ governmentality differ greatly among
countries. In all international comparisons, Italy is invariably ranked as less efficient than
France and Germany and often contends for last place with Spain and Portugal. And yet for
experts, for common sense, and for politicians themselves, it is within these three ‘on-
tologies’ that solutions for the government inefficiencies should be found: simpler and
more focused laws, without endless cross-references and long sequences of subordinate
legislation; public expenditures without corruption, waste and clientelism; criteria for the
organization of public administrations more concerned to reward the merit of officials and
to respect the needs of citizens and businesses.
Obstacles to institutional recognition
Where the mission of democratic institutions appears to be fully defined on the basis of
these three categories, the inclusion of the policy perspective encounters major obstacles.
As we saw in the first section, as long as the policy approach is understood as a generic
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exercise in aggregation and discussion of facts and opinions on specific topics, its
accommodation with the functioning of the institutions and the state’s powers does not
raise problems. The tensions arise when the policy paradigm requires the activation of
specific competencies different from those already recognized as ‘sciences of institutions’
for two reasons. First, policy analysis and evaluation refers not to generic problem-dealing
practices—in this general sense, also a tribe that performs animal sacrifices to obtain
rainfall is a policy-making institution—but to specific strategies of logical reasoning, with
their phases and techniques of verification, albeit adapted to the complexity of situations.
Secondly, this paradigm claims that it is able to integrate the other analytical perspectives
to furnish more meaningful criteria for action and assessment: not only well-written laws,
but solutions that can be evaluated for their impact; not only balanced budgets, but value
for money; not only administrative efficiency, but results.
Incorporating these claims into the functioning of democratic institutions encounters
four obstacles. The first has to do with the flexibility and antiformalism of the categories
used by policy analysis and evaluation. The key strength of the second-generation policy
paradigm, in fact, consists in its ability to take account of the limits to human rationality, as
does the post-Simon problem-solving logic on which it draws: ‘These limits are imposed
by the complexity of the world in which we live, the incompleteness and inadequacy of
human knowledge, the inconsistencies of individual preference and belief, the conflicts of
value among people and groups of people, and the inadequacy of the computations we can
carry out, even with the aid of the most powerful computers’ (National Academy of
Sciences 1986: 20). But in the continental European countries to which we refer, the
multiple adaptable approaches typical of policy analysis and evaluation become obstacles
to its institutional use because their potential indeterminacy can threaten the separation of
powers and the rights of citizens to hold the governments to account. In these countries,
there is widespread understanding of what law enforcement is, who should ensure it, and
who should resolve any ambiguities in it. Likewise, it is quite clear what constitutes public
spending without budget coverage and what responsibilities it entails. But what policy
implementation is, on whom its success depends, what consequences they should suffer in
the event of failure, and who should establish it are much more complex issues (Bovens
1998; Pierre and Peters 2005). As noted by von Beyme (2013) with reference to the
democracies of continental Europe, it is precisely the countries with a strong and cum-
bersome statehood that find it most difficult to incorporate the policy paradigm into their
governmentality.
The second obstacle overlaps also geographically with the first. It consists in linguistic
incompatibility, given that large part of the lexicon of policy sciences does not have (or has
lost) equivalents in the neo-Latin and German languages. While this is not a problem for
specialists,4 a science of and for institutions incomprehensible to the general public is a
contradiction that makes ‘unusable’ the knowledge produced within this paradigm to
improve the quality of public decisions.
From the point of view of its institutional acknowledgment, the nonintuitive meaning of
‘policy’ has impeded the processes of incremental assimilation that in Britain and the USA
have allowed the gradual insertion of policy skills into the technical structures at the
service of the executive and the legislature. Consider, for example, the increase in the
4 But also the experts sometimes have problems: In a call for applications of the European Personnel
Selection Office in February 2009 at http://europa.eu/epso/discover/job_profiles/index_en.htm, a post which
in English was ‘Policy Officer,’ on the corresponding Italian page was termed ‘Funzionario’ (a generic
public official) and on the French one ‘Charge´ de mission.’
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number of policy analysis experts in the Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress in the USA and the Research Service of the Commons Library in the UK: This
process has been simply considered a response to the need to update the knowledge
available to lawmakers.
This observation introduces the third obstacle encountered by institutionalization of the
policy paradigm: competition with more consolidated and accredited epistemic commu-
nities—those of lawyers, experts in public finance and public management. Competences
are expertise, but they are also domains, jurisdictions, authorities (Foucault 1977–1978;
Abbott 1988). The disciplines recognized as indispensable for the functioning of consti-
tutional bodies, and the administrative machinery ensures ample benefits for their spe-
cialists in terms of both stable careers and appointments to public bodies or advisory
committees. Also available to these specialists are a series of side-activities in schools of
public administration, consultancy companies, think tanks, and the media. It should be
pointed out, however, that investigation of this issue should consider not only the strength
of the paradigms recognized as sciences of institutions but also the weakness of the
challengers. In fact, compared with the corresponding Anglo-American organizations, the
continental epistemic communities aggregated around the social and behavioral sciences
have in recent decades shown scant interest in research applied to the problems addressed
by the political institutions and the social relevance of their studies. It is therefore
understandable that they have been repaid in kind.
Compatibility with the democratic game
We come now to the fourth and most important obstacle to the inclusion of policy analysis
and evaluation among disciplines with institutional dignity: its close proximity to politics;
a proximity which tends to become an overlap in the continental countries, which, as we
have seen, have only one term for the entire ‘polis-family of words.’ Those who warn of
the dangers of embedding the policy paradigm in the public sphere often express fear that
this will lead to a democratic deficit.
In order to analyze the diverse components of this argument, it is useful to go back a
hundred years to another great change in contemporary governmentality, when it was the
embedding of the ‘public administration’ ontology that was seen as a threat to the con-
stitutional democracy in Europe and in the USA.
The elements among which to fit the last piece of the puzzle are the same today as they
were a hundred years ago, and they can be grouped into two broad categories. The first
problem is where to place the new competencies and their providers in the constitutional
scheme (Rosenbloom 1987), which in democratic societies is based on a delicate balance
among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Rosenbloom uses the term ‘retrofitting’ to
define the search for an arrangement able to embed this new reality within the institutions
wanted by the Founding Fathers: ‘One of the ‘‘big questions’’ of American public
administration has been how to retrofit, or integrate, the federal administrative state into the
nation’s constitutional scheme’ (Rosenbloom 2000: 39).
The second problem is how to extract value from the new ontology and how to apply it
for the common good without restricting the space for politics, competition for consensus,
and the strength of leadership produced by this mechanism (Goldwin 1980).
Even in the country that has made the greatest contribution to establishing the policy
sciences as building blocks of contemporary governmentality, these two issues are not fully
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resolved, and they have reemerged even in recent times (Schambra 2009) in terms that
specifically link the risks of this retrofitting with those of the administrative reforms of the
Progressive Era:
Policy science, in this perspective, appears as one in a long series of efforts by the
Progressive Movement and its heirs to change the character of the American political
system—to transfer power from the corrupt, the ignorant, and the self-serving to the
virtuous, the educated, and the public-spirited, and to enhance the capacity of the
executive to make and carry out internally-consistent, comprehensive plans for
implementing the public interest (Banfield 1977: 7).
According to this perspective, the power of policy czars and policy wonks—which is the
power of agenda setting in the policy design phase, and the power of evaluation in the post-
implementation one—threatens the balance among the constitutional bodies, especially to the
detriment of the legislature, and it humiliates politics, which does not consist of scientific
evidence, but rather, according to Madison (1787), of ‘opinions, passions and interests.’5
If we go back to more than a hundred years ago, to the phase of the institutional rooting
of government as we know it today, we can find similar concerns in two great scholars:
Woodrow Wilson in the USA and Max Weber in Germany, who, although they analyzed
very different contexts, used similar terms to identify potential fault lines in the democratic
balance and proposed similar solutions. Both, in fact, saw strengthening of the legislature’s
function of oversight as the main instrument both to upgrade the role that constitutions
assign to the parliament and to improve the quality of the political game. For both, the
function of lawmaking, from which the legislature takes its name, should be combined with
the exercise of close control over the administration.
Wilson wrote:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the
voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. (…) The informing
function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. The argument
is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient
administration, but, more than that, that the only really self-governing people is that
people which discusses and interrogates its administration. (Wilson 1885: 303).
Weber argued likewise:
There is no substitute-for the systematic cross-examination (under oath) of experts
before a parliamentary commission in the presence of the respective departmental
officials. This alone guarantees public supervision and a thorough inquiry. Today, the
Reichstag simply lacks the right to proceed in this fashion: the constitution condemns
it to amateurish ignorance (Weber 1918: 1418).
Both authors saw this assumption of responsibility as essential for the upgrading of
politics.
Wilson wrote:
The talk on the part of Congress which we sometimes justly condemn is the profitless
squabble of words over frivolous bills or selfish party issues. It would be hard to
5 According to Napoleon, ‘Power is based upon opinion. What is a government not supported by opinion?
Nothing.’ (cit. from Ellul 1965).
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conceive of there being too much talk about the practical concerns and processes of
government. Such talk it is which, when earnestly and purposefully conducted, clears
the public mind and shapes the demands of public opinion. (Wilson 1885: 304).
Weber, who was closely attentive to the relationship between the quality of political
leadership and the functions of the parliament, which he considered to be ‘a recruiting
ground,’ ‘a palaestra’ for leaders, wrote:
…For only a working, not a merely speech-making parliament can provide the
ground for the growth and selective ascent of genuine leaders, not merely demagogic
talents. A working parliament, however, is one which supervises the administration
by continuously sharing its work. (Weber 1918: 1416).
The parliamentarization of the policy paradigm
Hence, an effective oversight function by parliaments is regarded as a necessary requirement
for an expansion of administrative capacities to be assimilated into the constitutional
framework. This third function, which integrates the powers of legislatures to make laws and
to tax and spend into a new pattern, developed in the Anglo-American models by assigning
new tasks to the Comptroller Generals (or Comptroller and Auditor-Generals), which already
acted as parliamentary watchdogs in monitoring the executive’s expenditure.
In the continental European democracies, parliamentary oversight has not been able to
rely on watchdogs whose only principal is the legislature, because their constitutions assign
the role of Supreme Audit Institutions to independent structures which report to both the
legislature and the executive. For countries that have inherited the Napoleonic model, these
are outright independent judiciaries, the Cours des Comptes, which draw on legal and
accounting skills, and which analyze the administration’s work only to sanction formal
irregularities in the management of public money.
It is evident that the parliamentary watchdogs of the Anglo-American model have been
able to extend their competencies incrementally from the auditing of public expenditures to
overseeing the performance of administrations. In the past three decades, these missions
have been gradually complemented with evaluation of the results of programs and projects
approved by the executive. Testifying to this evolution is the enlargement of the issues
addressed, and the research methods used, in their inquiries by the American Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the British National Audit Office (NAO).
To monitor the actions of their governments, the parliaments of continental Europe can
only rely on the traditional devices: conditioning the extent of delegated legislation with
primary legislation; scrutinizing the national budget and appropriations bills; using their
investigative powers; deploying the mainly legal skills of their staffs. With these limited
institutional and professional resources available, incremental extension of parliamentary
oversight to evaluation of the results of the executive’s policies, programs and projects is
very difficult.
This reconstruction shows why some countries, such as France and, most recently, Italy,
have decided to resolve the impasse by resorting to the strongest of legitimations: inclusion
in their constitutions of public policy evaluation as a function of parliament.6
6 Also Morocco with the constitutional reform of 2011 has followed this route. Article 70 of the new
Moroccan Constitution states: ‘Parliament exercises legislative power. It votes laws, controls Government
action and evaluates public policies.’
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Before this choice is analyzed more closely, a clarification is necessary. All the par-
liaments discussed in this paper have a system of committees based on the various areas of
public intervention: education, health, national security, and so on. All of these commit-
tees, therefore, are organized by policy sectors, if we give to this term the generic meaning
of a field of activity (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). As has been apparent at various points of
this paper, and as the experiences of the French and Italian parliaments demonstrate, this
system is not a sufficient condition for the growth of policy analytical capacity in those
institutions. The constitutionalization of parliament’s competencies in regard to the eval-
uation of public policies is justified precisely on the basis of this evidence. In the intentions
of those who propose it, the effect of this strong legitimation of ex post policy evaluation
should induce a recognition of the added value of a policy perspective even in the early
stages of ordinary legislative procedures, steering them toward a logic of ex ante policy
evaluation and design.
The constitutional reforms in France and Italy
Following the constitutional reform of 2008, Article 24 of the French Constitution states:
‘Le Parlement vote la loi. Il controˆle l’action du Gouvernement. Il e´value les politiques
publiques. (…).’7 The text, however, does not provide for the creation of a specific par-
liamentary watchdog responsible for technical conduct of the evaluation. In fact, according
to Article 47-2, that competency remains with the Cour des Comptes: ‘The National Cour
des Comptes assists Parliament in control of the action of the government. It assists
Parliament and the government in the control and execution of finance laws and the social
security financing laws, as well as in the evaluation of public policies. It helps to inform
citizens by publishing public reports.’
Following the reform, established within the National Assembly was the Comite´
d’e´valuation et de controˆle des politiques publiques (CEC). Its competencies, after the
opinion expressed by the Constitutional Council on the Rules of the National Assembly
(2009),8 are rather limited. In fact, on the basis of the opinion cited,
The monitoring and control of the execution of budget laws and the legislation
regarding social security financing are excluded from the committee’s jurisdiction, as
well as the evaluation of any matter relating to public finance and to the financing of
social security (…). Moreover, the separation of powers precludes that, in conducting
the evaluations, the rapporteurs of the Committee can benefit from the assistance of
experts working under the responsibility of the Government (…) The Committee’s
recommendations forwarded to the Government and the follow-up report on their
implementation cannot, under any circumstances, issue an injunction on the
Government.
The Comite´ has been in effective operation for too short a time for it to be possible to
take stock of its impact on the parliamentarization of the policy paradigm.
Evaluation of programs in which financial and regulatory aspects predominate is usually
assigned to the Cour des Comptes. Analyses of economic, social or environmental policies
7 The official English translation of this text is: ‘Parliament shall pass statutes. It shall monitor the action of





are conducted directly by the Comite´ using the standard tools of commissions of inquiry:
hearings, visits to places and institutions, panels of experts. The reports tend more to
emphasize the multiplicity of sources and the completeness of the information than to
provide succinct and incisive recommendations. The limits imposed by the Conseil Con-
stitutionnel explain the absence of specific follow-up reports on the effects of evaluations
of the executive’s and the administration’s actions like those produced by the GAO and the
NAO. In fact, the conclusions of the Comite´ cannot result in any direct conditioning on the
administration, which confirms the weak powers of the French Parliament.
As regards the Italian constitutional reform, the preparatory phase and the final for-
mulation demonstrate a marked disorientation in identifying a significant institutional
placement for the evaluation of public policies.
In the spring of 2013, at a time of great political tension, the President of the Republic
Giorgio Napolitano instructed two groups of experts to draw up proposals for economic
and institutional reforms.9 Their document called for a commitment to ‘the conduct of
effective policy evaluation’ in both the executive and the legislature. But the concrete
references were limited to the rules of legislative drafting and to the ‘Better Regulation’
principles promoted by the OECD. In the autumn of 2013, a subsequent expert commis-
sion, this one appointed by the government, made a number of important proposals for
constitutional reform. They included a decrease in the powers of the regions, and the end of
the so-called ‘perfect bicameralism,’ with a reduction in the role of the Senate in ordinary
legislation and the indirect election of senators by the members of the regional legislatures.
The text stated that ‘among the tasks of the two Houses of Parliament, and in particular the
Senate, of especial importance should be ‘‘evaluation of public policies.’’ which constitutes
a specification of the function of parliamentary control.’10
These proposals were translated into a Constitutional reform bill presented to Parlia-
ment and approved on April 12, 2016, in a climate of strong conflict between majority and
opposition.
The new wording of Article 55 assigned to the Senate the representation of the local
institutions and established that ‘it shall evaluate the public policies and the activities of
public administrations, and assesses the territorial impact of EU policies.’ The decision to
assign policy evaluation to the upper house, moreover in a context of weakening its
lawmaking function, was unique among bicameral parliaments. In addition, the new text
contained no reference to the technical structure that will have the task of performing the
evaluative analyses. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that almost all the technical
staff serving the Italian Parliament has legal training, mitigated only recently by the
inclusion of some economic, financial, and statistical specialists.
The new text was submitted to a public referendum. Also the campaign for the vote was
marked by conflict between those for and against. The issue of the new functions of the
Senate in the evaluation of public policies remained entirely marginal, even in the dec-
larations of the numerous political scientists who participated in the campaign. On
December 4, 2016, voters rejected the constitutional reform by a wide margin (59%
against).
The French and the Italian episodes, although their outcomes were different, share the
same premise. In both cases, the power of the respective parliaments to evaluate public
9 V. http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Napolitano/attivita/consultazioni/c_20mar2013/gruppi_lavoro/2013-04-
12_agenda_possibile.pdf.
10 Commissione per le riforme costituzionali, Per una democrazia migliore, Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri, Roma, p. 46.
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policies is not considered a simple evolution of their general function of controlling the
executive; rather, it requires specific constitutional legitimacy, in that it is judged more
intrusive than the ‘normal’ commissions of inquiry conducted according to a judicial logic,
and it is therefore potentially able to alter the relationship with the executive power.
Conclusions
The foregoing overview has given an idea of the difficulties encountered by attempts to
enlarge the categories with which a country’s institutional actors define and legitimize
what they do. Generally, we expect to find obstacles and resistances in the countries that
rank lowest in classifications of democratic stability. But the complications also concern
countries with mature constitutional systems and with open and competitive political
arenas.
These cases are generally considered to be mere technical delays due to a lack of
updated skills. This judgment, which underestimates the magnitude of the discrepancy, in a
certain respect pleases both the evaluators and the evaluated. There is a growing industry
of governance quality assessment by international organizations, national professional
societies, consulting firms, and universities. This industry has a strong interest in pro-
moting as universally recognized and endorsed a set of standards and indicators with which
to measure the value of government decisions. It is entirely in the interest of the gov-
ernments subject to evaluation to align themselves formally with these criteria and to have
their actual compliance overestimated, even when a bottom-up verification contradicts
such alignment (Jacob et al. 2015). The win–win outcome of this game between evaluator
and evaluated requires that the dissimilar logics be regarded as mere anomalies, as tem-
porary deficiencies easy to remedy, perhaps by increasing the number of experts and
consultants. The paper has argued that the problem in these countries may be not ‘just’ a
lack of capacities, but rather a different repertoire of the ontologies used to frame the
public sphere.
The policy ‘ontology’ is one of the building blocks of good governance. But there are
European countries where this recognition is only formal, devoid of any concrete effect,
because the skills and procedures used to run the institutions draw on other ideas and ideals
of how to govern the res publica. The concept of governmentality, at least in the version
used here, allows this diversity to be given its due importance by reconstructing the
epistemic, organizational and normative aspects which legitimize it.
This perspective makes it possible to grasp the obstacles that arise when a new para-
digm, that of policy, seeks a place among instruments of government with strong insti-
tutional rootedness and with (allegedly) finite sets of unambiguous instructions: the law,
public finance, public administration.11
Apparently, the parliamentarization of policy evaluation in France and the attempt in
Italy indicate a convergence with governmentalities that for decades have assigned to
legislatures the function of verifying the problem-solving capacity of executives.
In fact, in the two countries the linkage between law, public finance, and public
administration continues to predominate, as evidenced by the role of institutions
emblematic of Napoleonic governmentality, such the Cours des Comptes. But law and
11 Lest this observation be interpreted as nostalgia or prejudice, I would point out that I have spent my entire
professional life in an attempt to import the PAV into Italy.
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public finance also determine the parameters for verification of compliance with the
constraints imposed by membership of the European Union and the EU’s Monetary Union.
The difficult and incomplete processes for policy parliamentarization in France and Italy
shift the attention to another variable: the internal, autonomous capacity of the policy
paradigm to be convincing and to assert itself as an instrument that is a more candid,
sensible, straightforward, commonsensical and, eventually, democratic way of representing
and judging what governments do, taking as its parameter the concrete problems of people.
This vision, in which reappears the utopian reference to the happiness of people present in
the meaning of the term ‘policy’ in eighteenth-century Europe, in certain respects ree-
merges in the thought of Dewey and Lasswell. And a striving for a democracy that is more
pragmatic, and therefore more realistic and efficacious also appears in the authors that in
the 1950s and 1970s made the greatest contribution to the spread of this new type of useful
knowledge by tying ‘the art and craft’ of policy analysis to Speaking Truth to Power
(Wildavsky 1979) and The Intelligence of Democracy (Lindblom 1965). This endeavor is
an important part of the fascinating appeal of this paradigm even outside the American
cultural context that generated it.
Today, in the prescriptions that derive from the most authoritative supranational bodies,
the metaphor often associated with the need to update misaligned governmentalities is that
of medicine—bitter but necessary. The term ‘reform’ has become synonymous with
interventions that the citizens, voters, and taxpayers of a country would not choose on their
own, at least in the time and manner required from outside.
When greater policy capacity is required within these coordinates, conflict with the
principles upon which the political democratic consensus rests may become inevitable.
Hence, the emergence of the policy-oriented, or output (Peters 2011), or problem-solving
(Briggs 2008) governmentality is a very complex process, open to a wide range of different
effects. And it does not guarantee that a stronger policy capacity will be ‘directed towards
providing the knowledge needed to improve the practice of democracy.’ (Lasswell 1951:
15).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Abbott, A. (1988). The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Anderson, J. E. (1975). Public policy-making. New York: Praeger.
Banfield, E. C. (1977). Policy science as metaphysical madness. In R. Goldwin (Ed.), Statesmanship and
bureaucracy (pp. 1–35). Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Bevir, M. (2010). Rethinking governmentality: Towards genealogies of governance. European Journal of
Social Theory, 13(4), 423–441.
Bickman, L. (Ed.). (1987). Using program theory in evaluation. New directions for program evaluation. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Blum, S., & Schubert, K. (Eds.). (2013). Policy analysis in Germany. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Bobbio, N. (1987). La scienza politica e la tradizione di studi politici in Italia. In L. Graziano (Ed.), La
scienza politica in Italia. Bilancio e prospettive (pp. 44–60). Milano: Angeli.
Bovens, M. (1998). The quest for responsibility. Accountability and citizenship in complex organisations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Policy Sci
123
Briggs, X. (2008). Democracy as problem solving: Civic capacity in communities across the globe. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.). (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Peuter De, B., & Pattyn, V. (2009). Evaluation capacity: Enabler or exponent of evaluation culture. In A.
Fouquet & L. Me´asson (Eds.), L’e´valuation des politiques publiques en Europe: Cultures et futures
(pp. 133–142). Paris: L’Harmattan.
Dean, M. (1994). Critical and effective histories. Foucault’s methods and historical sociology. London:
Routledge.
Dye, T. R. (1972). Understanding public policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Dyson, K. H. F. (1980). The state tradition in Western Europe: A study of an idea and institution. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Ellul, J. (1965). Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Knopf.
Foucault, M. (1977–1978). Se´curite´, territoire, population: cours au College de France. Ed. Fr: (2004).
Paris: Gallimard-Seuil. Ed. En: (2007). Security, territory, population: lectures at the College de
France 1977—1978. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kellogg Foundation. (2004). Logic model development guide: Using logic models to bring together plan-
ning, evaluation, and action. Battle Creek, MI: W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
Giraud, O., & Warin, P. (2008). Politiques publiques et de´mocratie. Paris: La De´couverte/Pacte.
Goldwin, R. A. (Ed.). (1980). Bureaucrats, policy analysts, statesmen: Who leads?. Washington, DC: AEI
Press.
Gruber, T. (1993). A translation approach to portable ontology specifications. Knowledge Acquisition, 5(1),
199–220.
Heidenheimer, A. J. (1986). Politics, policy and policey as concepts in English and continental languages:
An attempt to explain divergences. The Review of Politics, 48(1), 3–30.
Hogwood, B. W. (1984). Policy analysis: The dangers of over sophistication. Public Administration Bul-
letin, 44, 19–28.
Hogwood, B. W., & Gunn, L. A. (1984). Policy analysis for the real world. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Howlett, M. (2009). Policy analytical capacity and evidence-based policy-making: Lessons from Canada.
Canadian Public Administration, 52(2), 153–175.
Jacob, S., Speer, S., & Furubo, J. (2015). The institutionalization of evaluation matters: Updating the
international atlas of evaluation 10 years later. Evaluation, 21(1), 6–31.
Jobert, B., & Muller, P. (1987). L’Etat en action. Politiques publiques et corporatismes. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
Lasswell, H. D. (1951). The policy orientation. In H. D. Lasswell & D. Lerner (Eds.), The policy sciences
(pp. 3–15). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lasswell, H. D., & McDougal, M. S. (1943). Legal education and public policy: Professional training in the
public interest. Yale Law Journal, 52(2), 203–295.
Lindblom, C. E. (1965). The intelligence of democracy. New York: Free Press.
Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (Eds.). (2014). The problem-solving capacity of the modern state: Governance
challenges and administrative capacities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Madison, J. (1787). The union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection. Federalist No. 10.
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm. Accessed June 25, 2016.
Me´ny, Y., & Thœnig, J. (1989). Politiques publiques. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and political life.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Muller, P. (2008). Analyse des politiques publiques et sciences politique en France: Je t’aime moi non plus.
Politiques et Management Public, 26(3), 51–56.
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (1986). Research
briefings 1986. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/911/
research-briefings-1986.
Peters, B.G. (1996). The policy capacity of government. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management
Development. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/SC94-61-18-1996E.pdf. Accessed June
25, 2016.
Peters, B. G. (2011). After managerialism what?: The return to political and strategic priorities. Croatian
and Comparative Public Administration, 11(3), 605–625.
Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2005). Governing complex societies. Trajectories and scenarios. Basingstoke:
Palgrave McMillan.
Regonini, G. (2012). Parlamenti analitici. Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche, 1, 33–87.
Policy Sci
123
Rose, N. (1996). Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies. In N. Rose, A. Barry, & T. Osborne (Eds.),
Foucault and political reason (pp. 305–443). London & Chicago: UCL Press.
Rosenbloom, D. H. (1987). Constitutional perspectives on public policy evaluation. Policy Studies Journal,
16(2), 233–241.
Rosenbloom, D. H. (2000). Retrofitting the administrative state to the Constitution: Congress and the
judiciary’s twentieth-century progress. Public Administration Review, 60(1), 39–46.
Sartori, G. (1989). The essence of the political in Carl Schmitt. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(1), 63–75.
Schambra, W. (2009). Obama and the policy approach. National Affairs, 1, 127–144. http://www.
nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20091229_Schambra_Fall09.pdf. Accessed June 25, 2016.
von Beyme, K. (2013). Historical forerunners of policy analysis in Germany. In S. Blum & K. Schubert
(Eds.), Policy analysis in Germany (pp. 19–27). Bristol: Policy-Press.
Webber, C., & Wildavsky, A. (1986). A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western world. New
York: Simon & Schuster.
Weber, M. (1918). Parliament and government in a reconstructed Germany (A contribution to the political
critique of officialdom and party politics). In M. Weber (Ed.), (1922–1978), Economy and society: An
outline of interpretive sociology (pp. 305–443). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wildavsky, A. (1979). Speaking truth to power: The art and craft of policy analysis. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company.
Wilson, W. (1885). Congressional government: A study in American politics. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/35861/35861-h/35861-h.htm. Accessed June 25, 2016.
Woo, J., Ramesh, M., & Howlett, M. (2015). Legitimation capacity: System-level resources and political
skills in public policy. Policy and Society, 34(3–4), 271–283.
Policy Sci
123
